















There are no flows exported in the first export because there are no flows older than 30 s. The second export at 60 s will shorten the bucket list by the amount of flows received and progressed longer than 30 s ago. Although this should be a considerable percentage of all saved flows it only has temporary effects because the bucket list will instantly be filled again by the attacker. With an attack speed of 10 000 packets/s even the temporary effect is only marginal. N.B., an attack speed of 10 000 packets/s results in a transmission rate of about 4 MBit/s due to the small packet size of 54 byte.

## V. CONCLUSION

The obvious countermeasure against the hash collision DoS is a hash function for which collisions cannot easily be created. Cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 [15] or SHA-1 [16] would provide such a feature but take too long to compute to be efficiently deployed in a flow monitor. It seems that a randomized permutation table could offer sufficient speed and security but this has yet to be tested. There might be an even easier solution using random values with simple addition and multiplication. Finding an optimal function for hash table organization in flow monitoring will be future research.

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