

David Eckhoff, Tobias Limmer and Falko Dressler

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Attacking the Hash Table based Data Structures of Flow Monitors

David Eckhoff, Tobias Limmer and Falko Dressler
Computer Networks and Communication Systems
Dept. of Computer Science, University of Erlangen, Germany

Abstract—Aggregation modules within flow-based network monitoring tools make use of fast lookup methods to be able to quickly assign received packets to their corresponding flows. In software-based aggregators, hash tables are usually used for this task, as these offer constant lookup times under optimal conditions. The hash functions used for mapping flow keys to hash values need to be chosen carefully to ensure optimal utilization of the hash table. If attackers are able to create collisions, the hash table degenerates to linked lists with worst-case lookup times of $O(n)$ and greatly reduce the performance of the aggregation modules. In this report, we analyze the aggregation modules of software-based flow meters Vermont and nProbe. We evaluate the resilience strength of used hash functions by theoretical analysis and confirm the results by performing real attacks.

Index Terms—targeted attacks, flow monitoring, denial of service, hash collision

I. INTRODUCTION

A crucial function for a high-speed flow-based network monitors is to use efficient data structures for packet processing [1], [2]. Therefore, flow monitoring tools like Vermont [3] and nProbe [4] use hash tables for internal flow processing. A flow record is the aggregated representation of all packets that share common properties. These attributes are typically the source and destination IP addresses, the source and destination ports, and the used protocol. In the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) standard [5], [6], which supersedes the Netflow.v9 architecture [7], these attributes are referred to as flow keys.

The advantage of using hash tables is the constant lookup time $O(1)$, i.e. for each received packet, it takes constant time to determine whether the packet belongs to an already existing flow, or if a new flow needs to be created. Hash tables usually have a constant size h_{size} and consist of so-called hash buckets. A hash function $k = h(x)$ maps values to discrete integer values in the range $k \in [0, h_{\text{size}})$. However, due to the limited size

of such a hash table, it is inevitable that two different flows are mapped to the same hash bucket sooner or later. One possible way to handle such a collision is that each bucket of the hash table is able to store multiple flows in form of a linked list. Thus, this list maintains all the concurrent flows that match the same hash key. The disadvantage of this method is that it takes an additional linear lookup time $O(n)$ to find an entry in this unsorted list. Therefore, it is essential to keep the length of these lists as small as possible. Otherwise, the system might become overloaded and it will not be able to process all the received packets. Dropped packets imply dropped information and, thus, attacks or anomalies may remain undetected [8].

If the hash function used for calculating the hash keys offers a uniform distribution, the length of all bucket lists would be almost equal. Thus, a reasonably sized hash data structure should perform well, i.e. flow lookup is fast because of minimal list lengths.

A typical Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack sends huge amounts of data packets, e.g. TCP packets with the SYN flag set, to a victim host or subnet in order to deplete resources at the receiving end. Assuming that the source address is used as a flow key, the use of randomized spoofed source IP addresses would cause a network monitor observing those packets to create a new flow for each attack packet. If the spoofed address is completely random and if no countermeasures are taken, such an attack will uniformly fill the bucket lists in the hash table until the lists become too long to be efficiently scanned and the flow monitor will begin to drop packets. The bigger the hash table is, the more packets are needed to create such long collision lists and it is more likely that the hash table does not represent a bottleneck.

However, if the attacker is able to systematically create packets that lead to collisions in the monitor's hash table, it would require much less effort, i.e. less packets, to bring the monitor into such an overloaded

state. The attacker will try to create new flow records that would be inserted in very few, or even a single bucket inside the hash table. Then the monitor will spend most of the time scanning these extraordinarily long bucket lists, and so its performance will decrease and a considerable amount of packets will be dropped.

A hash function should therefore have the following characteristics:

- The computed hash keys should be uniformly distributed
- It should be impossible for an attacker to create directed collisions
- The hash function must be fast so that it does not become a bottleneck

In this report, we study the hash functions used in the two frequently used flow monitors Vermont and nProbe (Section II). We identify possible vulnerabilities that can be exploited for directed attacks against the flow monitor. Vermont uses CRC to hash flow keys, so we specifically analyze this hash function for vulnerabilities (Section III). Furthermore, we demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks and present selected measurement results (Section IV). Finally, we discuss possible countermeasures and give some conclusions (Section V).

II. HASH FUNCTIONS USED IN VERMONT AND nPROBE

Vermont and nProbe use different functions to calculate the hash keys for incoming packets. The input for the hash function is given by the specification of the flow template. This template includes so-called flow keys that define the fields used as grouping criteria. A 5-tuple flow aggregation would have the flow keys $\langle srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, proto \rangle$.

Whereas nProbe uses simple binary addition of all flow keys for its hash function, Vermont uses a nested call hierarchy of the CRC32 algorithm. In the following, we analyze both techniques and determine their attack vectors.

A. Hash index calculation in nProbe

Due to the simplicity of nProbe’s hash function, it is easy to see how collisions can be created. Assuming packets with the same values in source IP address ($srcIP$), destination IP address ($dstIP$), source port ($srcP$), destination port ($dstP$), and protocol ($proto$) are aggregated to a single flow, nProbe would calculate the hash key k of size h_{size} as follows:

$$k = (srcIP + dstIP + srcP + dstP + proto) \mod h_{size} \quad (1)$$

Every packet producing the same result from Equation 1 will be stored in the same hash bucket and will therefore increase the length of the corresponding bucket list. If an attacker wants to create a packet p_{i+1} , which collides with packet p_i , he simply sets $srcP_{p_{i+1}} = srcP_{p_i} - 1$, $srcIP_{p_{i+1}} = srcIP_{p_i} + 1$, and copies all other flow keys. Both packets then produce the same hash key. Attackers usually avoid modifying $dstIP$, as the packet may not reach the targeted monitoring system anymore – unless the attacker has more information about the network structure.

Since the goal is to deplete resources of the network monitor, it is not necessary that the packet is actually accepted by a receiver. It is therefore possible to modify all the remaining fields used in Equation 1 – resulting in four freely changeable fields: $srcIP$ (32 Bit), $srcP$ (16 Bit), $dstP$ (16 Bit), and $proto$ (1 Bit for TCP and UDP, assuming no other protocol will be used). Thus, it is theoretically possible to create $(2^{32} \times 2^{16} \times 2^{16} \times 2^1) / h_{size}$ different packets matching the same hash bucket. For a hash table size of 16 Bit, 2^{49} flows can be created that are added to the same hash bucket. Even if the destination port cannot be varied, e.g. due to installed firewalls, still 2^{33} different flows are matching a single hash bucket.

We captured a packet trace from a network and used nProbe to aggregate it to flows. h_{size} was set to 2^{16} and nProbe was configured not to remove any buckets from its hash table during the test. Figure 1 shows the utilization of hash buckets after 3 million packets. Whereas the distribution over all buckets seems to work appropriately, there is a noticeable amount of buckets that contain a considerably larger number of entries. Thus, the distribution is not uniform – however, in the general case, the number of overused buckets might be small enough to ensure a proper operation of the flow aggregation.

B. CRC32 based hashing in Vermont

Instead of summing up all flow keys, Vermont calculates hash keys via repeated execution of the CRC32 checksum algorithm. Listing 1 shows Vermont’s index calculation for the hash table. The initial seed value can either be constant or random. Flow aggregation with five flow keys results in calling the CRC32 function five times. Furthermore, each result from the preceding calculation is used as the seed for the next calculation.

We used the identical test setting as in the hash bucket test of nProbe: Vermont was configured not




Figure 1. Distribution of nProbe's hash function




Figure 2. Distribution of Vermont's hash function

to remove any entries from its hash table with size 2^{16} and used the same packet trace to monitor 3 million packets. Figure 2 shows that this method offers a roughly uniform distribution over the hash table and, thus, fulfills one of the three requirements. Furthermore the CRC32 algorithm performs quite fast, so its usage as a hash function seems suitable.

Listing 1. Calculate hash bucket

```

1 hash = seed;
2 flowkey = flowkeys.first();
3 while (flowkey != null)
4 {
5   hash = crc32(hash, flowkey);
6   flowkey = flowkey->next;
7 }
8 return hash;

```

III. LIMITATIONS OF THE CRC HASH

In order to show that the CRC32 algorithm does not provide appropriate collision resistance, we first explain the operation of CRC32. The most frequently used method in performance critical systems is the use of the direct lookup table method [9], which is depicted in Figure 3. This algorithm, which is listed in




Figure 3. Working principle of the CRC32 lookup table method [10]

detail in Algorithm 1, works on a per byte basis. The creation of the lookup table is depicted in Listing 2.

Listing 2. Lookup table creation

```

1 for(int i = 0; i < 256; i++)
2 {
3   CRC = i;
4   for(int j = 8; j > 0; j--)
5   {
6     if(CRC & 1)
7       CRC = (CRC >> 1) ^ GeneratorPoly;
8     else
9       CRC >>= 1;
10  }
11  CRCTable[i] = CRC;
12 }

```

It has been shown that it requires the change of n Bit in the byte stream to create a collision for a CRC- n function [10]. Please note that these collisions are calculated and not the result of a plain brute force attack. Collisions for a known seed can be calculated straight forward.

The IEEE recommended CRC32, which has been first proposed in 1975 [11], uses 0xFFFFFFFF as the initial seed. This seed is placed in the register before the algorithm is executed. Before returning the final result, i.e. the value of the register after processing all bytes, the register is XORed with a final value. This final

Algorithm 1 CRC calculation

- 1: move seed s into register r
 - 2: **while** there are input bytes i to process **do**
 - 3: put lowest byte of r in idx
 - 4: Shift r right by one byte
 - 5: XOR idx with new byte from i to yield index into lookup table
 - 6: XOR lookup table value into register r
 - 7: **end while**
 - 8: XOR final value f into register r
-

XOR is 0xFFFFFFFF for the CRC32, i.e. the bits of the register are simply flipped. The CRC16 uses 0x0000 for both initial seed and final XOR value.

In the following, we refer to the computation of the CRC of byte vector a for seed s as $\text{crc}(s, a)$. For the CRC32, four bytes are needed to create a collision. Those bytes do not have to be added to the end, but can be placed anywhere in the byte array as shown in [12]. Furthermore, it is also possible to change four bytes that are already existing based on two given byte arrays a, b of arbitrary length, a byte vector x with a length of 4Byte, a seed value s , and the final XOR value f . Assuming we want to find $\text{crc}(s, axb) = Y$, we simply calculate a seed s' so that $\text{crc}(s', b) = Y$, then an x can be found so that $\text{crc}(s, ax) = f \oplus s'$. This will result in $\text{crc}(s, axb) = Y$.

Even nested CRC32 calls do not provide additional security against collision attacks. Let s be again the initial seed value, a, a', b , and c random strings, and f be the final XOR value, then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{crc}(\text{crc}(s, a), b) &= \text{crc}(\text{crc}(s, a'), b) \\ \Leftrightarrow \text{crc}(s, a') &= \text{crc}(s, a). \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, it holds

$$\begin{aligned} \text{crc}(\text{crc}(s, b), a) &= \text{crc}(s, ca) \\ \Leftrightarrow \text{crc}(s, c) \oplus f &= \text{crc}(s, b). \end{aligned}$$

For CRC16, the initial seed and final XOR value are set to 0x0000, so

$$\begin{aligned} \text{crc}(s, ab) &= \text{crc}(f \oplus \text{crc}(s, a), b) \\ &= \text{crc}(\text{crc}(s, a), b). \end{aligned}$$

Collisions found for one seed value will not necessarily collide for another seed value. However, it is possible to use already found collisions and add a prefix so they will collide for another seed. Let the byte vectors a and b collide for seed s , i.e. $\text{crc}(s, a) = \text{crc}(s, b)$. We can now let these byte arrays collide for seed s' by adding a prefix p , which will fill the register with value s , i.e. $f \oplus \text{crc}(s', p) = s$. If such a p is found, then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{crc}(s', pa) &= \text{crc}(s', pb) \\ &= \text{crc}(s, a) \\ &= \text{crc}(s, b). \end{aligned}$$

A possible countermeasure against attacks based on the described hash collision procedure would be to use a random seed value, i.e. to make it impossible for the attacker to guess the seed to use for the collision calculations. Unfortunately, we found out that two strings

a and b with $|a| = |b|$ will collide independently of the seed. For simplicity reasons, we only show this for the CRC16.

Collisions are seed independent if the bytes used to create collisions are independent of the seed. If a collision for a three byte long vector $\vec{k} = k_0k_1k_2$ should be found, we need to calculate x_1x_2 to a given x_0 so that $\text{crc}(s, \vec{k}) = \text{crc}(s, \vec{x})$.

Using the table lookup function lkp (see Listing 2), the calculation of the CRC $\text{crc}(s, \vec{k}) = \text{crc}(s, k_0k_1k_2)$ works as follows:

$\text{crc}(s, \vec{k})$:			
iter.	$hi(r)$	$lo(r)$	table lookup
0	$hi(s)$	$lo(s)$	$a_0 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_0)$
1	$hi(a_0)$	$hi(s) \oplus lo(a_0)$	$a_1 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_1)$
2	$hi(a_1)$	$hi(a_0) \oplus lo(a_1)$	$a_2 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_2)$
3	$hi(a_2)$	$hi(a_1) \oplus lo(a_2)$	$r \oplus f = CRC$

\vec{r} denotes the register, and $hi()$ and $lo()$ refer respectively to the higher and lower byte of the given variable. Each iteration shows the state of \vec{r} at the Similarly, $\text{crc}(s, \vec{x}) = \text{crc}(s, x_0x_1x_2)$ can be calculated:

$\text{crc}(s, \vec{x})$:			
iter.	$hi(r)$	$lo(r)$	table lookup
0	$hi(s)$	$lo(s)$	$a'_0 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_0)$
1	$hi(a'_0)$	$hi(s) \oplus lo(a'_0)$	$a'_1 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_1)$
2	$hi(a'_1)$	$hi(a'_0) \oplus lo(a'_1)$	$a'_2 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_2)$
3	$hi(a'_2)$	$hi(a'_1) \oplus lo(a'_2)$	$r \oplus f = CRC$

The high byte of each entry in the lookup table is unique [10]. Thus, from $\text{crc}(s, \vec{k}) = \text{crc}(s, \vec{x})$ it can be concluded that $a_2 = a'_2$ and $a_1 = a'_1$. This means that

$$hi(s) \oplus lo(a'_0) \oplus x_1 = hi(s) \oplus lo(a_0) \oplus k_1$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow x_1 &= lo(a'_0) \oplus lo(a_0) \oplus k_1 \\ &= lo(lkp(lo(s) \oplus x_0)) \oplus \\ &\quad lo(lkp(lo(s) \oplus k_0)) \oplus k_1 \end{aligned}$$

and furthermore

$$hi(a'_0) \oplus lo(a'_1) \oplus x_2 = hi(a_0) \oplus lo(a_1) \oplus k_2$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow x_2 &= hi(a'_0) \oplus hi(a_0) \oplus k_2 \\ &= hi(lkp(lo(s) \oplus x_0)) \oplus \\ &\quad hi(lkp(lo(s) \oplus k_0)) \oplus k_2. \end{aligned}$$

To prove that x_1 and x_2 are independent of s , we have to show that $lkp(lo(s) \oplus x_0) \oplus lkp(lo(s) \oplus k_0)$ is independent of s . This can be done by studying

the $lkp()$ function, which is described in Listing 2. This function creates the lookup table used for the CRC calculation. A mathematical representation of the $lkp()$ function is given below (we assume that $lkp(x)$ will create the lookup table entry for index x , with G_i being the i 'th bit of the generator polynomial and $c_i(t)$ referring to the i 'th bit after the t 'th iteration):

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{c}(0, x) &= x \\ c_i(t, x) &= \begin{cases} 0 & i > 15 \\ (G_i \& c_0(t-1, x)) \\ \oplus c_{i+1}(t-1, x) & i \leq 15 \end{cases} \\ lkp(x) &= \vec{c}(7, x) \end{aligned}$$

Looking into the calculation of the i 'th bit of $lkp(lo(s) \oplus x_0) \oplus lkp(lo(s) \oplus k_0)$, first we show that the calculation only depends on the first iteration of the $lkp()$ function:

$$\begin{aligned} c_i(t, x) \oplus c_i(t, k) &= \\ &= ((G_i \& c_0(t-1, x)) \oplus c_{i+1}(t-1, x)) \oplus \\ &\quad ((G_i \& c_0(t-1, k)) \oplus c_{i+1}(t-1, k)) \\ &= (G_i \& c_0(t-1, x)) \oplus (G_i \& c_0(t-1, k)) \oplus \\ &\quad c_{i+1}(t-1, x) \oplus c_{i+1}(t-1, k) \\ &= (G_i \& (c_0(t-1, x) \oplus c_0(t-1, k))) \oplus \\ &\quad c_{i+1}(t-1, x) \oplus c_{i+1}(t-1, k) \end{aligned}$$

Now that we have reduced the problem of $\vec{c}(t, x) \oplus \vec{c}(t, k)$ to $\vec{c}(t-1, x) \oplus \vec{c}(t-1, k)$, it is sufficient to show that all seed bits cancel each other out for $\vec{c}(0, x) \oplus \vec{c}(0, k)$:

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{c}(0, x) \oplus \vec{c}(0, k) &= lo(s) \oplus x_0 \oplus lo(s) \oplus k_0 \\ &= x_0 \oplus k_0 \end{aligned}$$

If it can further be shown that this is valid not only for vectors of length three but for byte arrays of arbitrary length, we can prove that collisions for the CRC16 algorithm are independent of the seed if both input vectors have equal length. The calculation of $\text{crc}(s, \vec{k})$ and $\text{crc}(s, \vec{x})$ with $|\vec{x}| = |\vec{k}| = n$ is similar to the two-byte operation.

crc(s, \vec{k}):			
iter.	$hi(r)$	$lo(r)$	table lookup
0	$hi(s)$	$lo(s)$	$a_0 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_0)$
1	$hi(a_0)$	$hi(s) \oplus lo(a_0)$	$a_1 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_1)$
.	.	.	.
n-1	$hi(a_{n-2})$	$hi(a_{n-3}) \oplus lo(a_{n-2})$	$a_{n-1} = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_{n-1})$
n	$hi(a_{n-1})$	$hi(a_{n-2}) \oplus lo(a_{n-1})$	$a_n = lkp(lo(r) \oplus k_n)$
n+1	$hi(a_n)$	$hi(a_{n-1}) \oplus lo(a_n)$	$r \oplus f = CRC$

crc(s, \vec{x}):			
iter.	$hi(r)$	$lo(r)$	table lookup
0	$hi(s)$	$lo(s)$	$a'_0 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_0)$
1	$hi(a'_0)$	$hi(s) \oplus lo(a'_0)$	$a'_1 = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_1)$
.	.	.	.
n-1	$hi(a'_{n-2})$	$hi(a'_{n-3}) \oplus lo(a'_{n-2})$	$a'_{n-1} = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_{n-1})$
n	$hi(a'_{n-1})$	$hi(a'_{n-2}) \oplus lo(a'_{n-1})$	$a'_n = lkp(lo(r) \oplus x_n)$
n+1	$hi(a'_n)$	$hi(a'_{n-1}) \oplus lo(a'_n)$	$r \oplus f = CRC$

For the computed bytes x_{n-1} and x_n , the bytes that create the collision, we now have:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{n-1} &= hi(a'_{n-3}) \oplus hi(a_{n-3}) \oplus \\ &\quad lo(a'_{n-2}) \oplus lo(a_{n-2}) \oplus k_{n-1} \\ x_n &= hi(a'_{n-2}) \oplus hi(a_{n-2}) \oplus k_n \end{aligned}$$

We already demonstrated that all seed bits are canceled for $n = 2$. In order to show that this holds for any n , we have to prove that $a_i \oplus a'_i$ is independent of s . The CRC algorithm shows that values for a_i (and a'_i likewise) can be calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} a_0 &= lkp(lo(s) \oplus k_0) \\ a_1 &= lkp(hi(s) \oplus lo(a_0) \oplus k_1) \\ a_i &= lkp(hi(a_{i-2}) \oplus lo(a_{i-1}) \oplus k_1) \end{aligned}$$

With this knowledge, first, it can be seen that increasing n by one results into one additional nested call to $lkp()$ in a_{n-2} and a'_{n-2} . If $|\vec{x}| = |\vec{k}|$, the number of nested calls are equal. Secondly, as shown in Listing 2, the $lkp()$ function performs bit-wise operations and each input bit will always affect the output bits at the same position. This means the input bits of the innermost nested call to $lkp()$ will affect the same bits of the final outcome.

Due to its recursive nature, the results of the two innermost calls will be a_0 and a_1 , or a'_0 and a'_1 , respectively. This results in s affecting the same bits in a_i and a'_i . Hence $a_i \oplus a'_i$ will cancel out all bits of s , thus, x_n and x_{n-1} are independent of s .

N.B., if $|\vec{x}| \neq |\vec{k}|$, the number of nested calls on both sides differ and the seed bits will affect different bits of the final outcome, thus will not cancel each other out.

Exploiting the knowledge that random CRC seeds do not protect against hash collision attacks, an attacker can construct packets that produce hash collisions, i.e. the corresponding flows will be stored in the same hash bucket in Vermont. For random destination and source ports, it is possible to create any CRC value

by manipulating the source IP field, which provides sufficient space for the needed bytes.

Say an attacker wants to create collisions for the hash key Y . Using the IP-5-tupel as flow keys, Vermont calculates the hash key as follows:

$$Y = \text{crc}(\dots(\text{crc}(s, \text{srcIP}), \text{dstIP}), \text{prot}), \text{srcP}), \text{dstP}).$$

The attacker then does the following:

- Choose random values for srcP' and dstP'
- Calculates seed s' so that $Y = \text{crc}(\text{crc}(s', \text{srcP}'), \text{dstP}')$. This is possible using the reverse CRC operation described in [10].
- If the destination IP should not be changed and the protocol is either TCP or UDP, then calculate seed s'' so that $\text{crc}(\text{crc}(s'', \text{dstIP}), \text{prot}) = s'$.
- In a final step, the necessary source IP is calculated so that $\text{crc}(s, \text{srcIP}) = s''$.

With this method, it is possible to create $2^{16} \times 2^{16} \times 2^1 = 2^{33}$ different flows for which the Vermont CRC32-based hashing algorithm produces the same hash value. Because all of the above fields have the same length for each packet, they will collide independently of the seed.

IV. ATTACKING THE NETWORK MONITOR

We evaluated the identified threats for producing attacks against the hash based data structures of typical flow monitors. In particular, we explored this for nProbe and Vermont. For all our experiments, we prepared a test network consisting of two server PCs (Dual Xeon 2 GHz) directly connected over a 100 MBit/s network link to evaluate the particular attack model. The network monitoring software was installed on one PC while the attack was launched from the other one. In a first test, we simulated a typical SYN flood based DoS attack [13] by randomly creating TCP SYN packets and sending these to the monitor. The attack packets were sent using the `tcpreplay` toolkit [14].

For our experiments, we configured the hash table size to 2^{16} buckets. Both the passive and active timeout were set to values larger than 60 s, thus, no packets were exported during the test. Figure 4 shows the results of our experimental attacks against nProbe and Vermont. Each value represents the average percentage dropped packets over a 60 s interval.

While the regular SYN-based DoS attack reached a maximum of about 6% of dropped packets, the hash collision attack only needed a data rate of about 7500 packets/s to exceed 90% of dropped packets.




Figure 4. DoS vs. hash collision attacks on Vermont and nProbe




Figure 5. Hash collision attack with different speeds

Note that the hash table size has no influence on the hash collision attack, but only on the SYN DoS attack because the former just targets one bucket, while the latter spreads over the whole data structure. As can be seen, the hash collision attack is similarly effective for nProbe and Vermont. The SYN DoS attack is only shown for Vermont. The results for nProbe were similar.

In order to measure the effect of flow exporting on the collision attack, we configured Vermont's export interval to 30 s with a passive timeout of 30 s. In this set of experiments, we used three different packet rates for the hash collision attack. The results are depicted in Figure 5.

It took a few seconds for the hash bucket list to exceed some maximum length (which is dependent on the available processing performance of the used CPU) for the lower attack rates. As can be seen, 10 000 packets/s were enough to exceed a rate of 50% dropped packets after one second and 90% of dropped packets after three seconds. The longer the bucket list is, the more packets are dropped because it takes longer time to traverse the list.

There are no flows exported in the first export because there are no flows older than 30 s. The second export at 60 s will shorten the bucket list by the amount of flows received and progressed longer than 30 s ago. Although this should be a considerable percentage of all saved flows it only has temporary effects because the bucket list will instantly be filled again by the attacker. With an attack speed of 10 000 packets/s even the temporary effect is only marginal. N.B., an attack speed of 10 000 packets/s results in a transmission rate of about 4 MBit/s due to the small packet size of 54 byte.

V. CONCLUSION

The obvious countermeasure against the hash collision DoS is a hash function for which collisions cannot easily be created. Cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 [15] or SHA-1 [16] would provide such a feature but take too long to compute to be efficiently deployed in a flow monitor. It seems that a randomized permutation table could offer sufficient speed and security but this has yet to be tested. There might be an even easier solution using random values with simple addition and multiplication. Finding an optimal function for hash table organization in flow monitoring will be future research.

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